NOVA YORK - O Dr. Donald Griffin esteve no zoológico do Central Park observando ursos polares que esfregavam seus narizes em uma pedra sintética recheada com um creme de amendoim. "Eles gostaram muito do creme", nota Griffin, enquanto olha para Gus, que pesa 400 quilos, tentando enfiar seu nariz em um suculento buraco da pedra.
Para algum desavisado a cena poderia parecer somente mais um dos tantos episódios de alimentação de animais no zoológico, mas ao exercício com a pedra e o lanche no Central Park cabe o nome bem mais honroso de "aperfeiçoamento animal", e é destinado a estimular a mente dos ursos, assim como seus apetites. Trata-se de um conceito por cuja criação os ursos deveriam agradecer, em grande parte, a Griffin, que está com 85 anos de idade.
Há vinte e cinco anos, ele publicou um pequeno livro que sugeria que os humanos não contavam com o monopólio dos pensamentos e dos sentimentos. Os animais, ele argumentava, provavelmente também os possuíam.
Os cientistas ficaram horrorizados. De acordo com a teoria behaviorista dominante naquela época, os animais eram pouco mais que "autômatos capazes de responder a estímulos", robôs que possuíam um sistema nervoso central.
A idéia de que uma formiga ou um elefante pudesse ter pensamentos, representações, experiências ou crenças não era somente risível: era sediciosa. Após Griffin ter publicado um segundo breve estudo a respeito da consciência animal na década de 1980, um behaviorista classificou o trabalho como "'Os versos satânicos' do comportamento animal".
Não fosse pelo fato de que ele ocupava uma posição respeitável na Universidade Rockfeller e uma reputação internacional, Griffin talvez viesse a perder seu emprego. (Quando era estudante de graduação em Harvard, na década de 1940, ele contribuiu para resolver um mistério: de que maneira os morcegos voavam no escuro, e cunhou o termo ecolocação para descrever o fenômeno).
"Ele insistia para que as pessoas examinassem a consciência animal numa época em que ela era considerada antropomórfica e etérea", afirmou Sarah Blaffer Hardy, uma professora emérita de antropologia da Universidade da Califórnia em Davis. "Qualquer outro teria sido execrado".
Porém o campo batizado por Griffin como etologia cognitiva ao final acabou vingando. Somente na última década surgiu uma avalanche de novos dados que parecem ter feito com que a maré virasse a seu favor. No Arizona um papagaio africano chamado Alex é capaz de identificar cores e formas tão bem quanto qualquer criança de uma pré-escola. Na Georgia um macaco bonobo chamado Kanzi dialoga com seu treinador pelo teclado de um computador e assiste filmes de Tarzan na televisão.
Pesquisadores do Instituto de Tecnologia de Massachusetts (MIT) apresentaram um estudo que sugere que os ratos sonham. Programas de aperfeiçoamento animal que apresentam jogos de raciocínio sob o disfarce de brinquedos ou brincadeiras tornaram-se uma parte da vida diária dos zoológicos. E nesta primavera, a editora da Universidade de Chicago publicará uma edição atualizada do livro lançado por Griffin em 1992, "Mentes animais".
Mas Griffin, um homem alto, magro e elegante e que possui uma predileção especial por gravatas com temas do mundo animal, é modesto demais para dizer que estes avanços são uma conquista sua. "Aquilo que sabemos ainda é muito pouco", ele diz. "Os cientistas, e eu me incluo entre eles, passaram a ser muito cautelosos. Os primeiros trabalhos a respeito da gestualidade e das expressões faciais dos primatas foram terrivelmente mal interpretados".
Na verdade, as recentes descobertas parecem somente ter incendiado o debate a respeito da consciência animal que já vinha sendo travado entre filósofos, psicólogos e outros cientistas. Pois se se verificar que os animais podem pensar, então a idéia de que a consciência é um atributo único dos humanos - um dos postulados básicos do ocidente desde Descartes - torna-se insustentável.
Gus, Alex e Kanzi certamente não são autômatos cartesianos, mas qual o seu grau de consciência? Eles vivenciam a dor, o desejo e outras sensações da mesma forma que os humanos? (Os filósofos definem isto como a consciência fenomênica). Eles são capazes de refletir a respeito de suas experiências? (Os filósofos definem isto como auto-consciência). Eles possuem crenças? E quanto a lembrar do passado? Será que os vermes possuem alguma forma de consciência? E as salamandras? Será que é possível estudar a vida interior de uma animal?
NEW YORK - Dr. Donald Griffin was at the Central Park Zoowatching polar bears rubbing their noses in a stonesynthetic stuffed with a peanut sauce. "They really likecream, "notes Griffin, as Gus, who weighs 400 pounds,trying to stick their nose into an enticingly sticky knothole.
For some unsuspecting scene might seem just another of the manyepisodes of feeding animals at the zoo, but the exercise withstone and lunch in Central Park bears the name and most honorable of"Animal enrichment" and is intended to stimulate the bears'as well as their appetites. This is a concept for which theBears should thank, in large part to Griffin, who is 85years of age.
Twenty-five years, he published a short book suggesting that thehumans did not have the monopoly on thoughts and feelings.Animals, he argued, most likely had them, too.Scientists were appalled. According to behaviorist theorydominant at the time, animals were little more than "automatacapable of responding to stimuli, "robots that possess a nervous systemcentral.
The idea that an ant or an elephant might have thoughts,images, experiences or beliefs was not just laughable: it wasseditious. After Dr. Griffin published a second brief onof animal consciousness in the 1980s, a behaviorist labeledwork as "'The Satanic Verses' of animal behavior."
Were it not for the fact that he occupied a respectable position inRockefeller University and an international reputation, perhaps Griffinwould lose their jobs. (As a graduate student inHarvard, in 1940, he helped solve a mystery:how bats navigate in the dark, and coined the term echolocationto describe the phenomenon).
"He insisted that people look at animal consciousnesstime when it was considered anthropomorphic and ethereal, "said SarahBlaffer Hardy, an emeritus professor of anthropology at the University ofCalifornia at Davis. "Anyone else would have been hooted."
But the field Dr. Griffin christened cognitive ethology finaljust revenge. Over the past decade came an avalanche of newdata that appear to have caused the tide turned in his favor. InArizona an African Grey parrot named Alex can identify colors andshapes as well as any other child in a preschool. In Georgia abonobo ape named Kanzi converses with his trainer for a keyboardcomputer and watches Tarzan movies on television.
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)presented a study suggesting that rats dream. ProgramsAnimal enrichment featuring mental puzzles under the guisetoys or games have become a part of daily life forzoos. And this spring, the editor of the University of Chicagopublish an updated edition of the book released in 1992 by Griffin,"Animal Minds."But Griffin, a tall, slim and elegant and has a predilectionSpecial themes for ties with the animal world, is too modest tosay that these developments as its achievement. "We know sois very little, "he says." Scientists, and I count myself among them,became very cautious. The first works aboutgestures and facial expressions of the primates have been terriblymisinterpreted. "
Indeed, recent findings seem to have only intensified thedebate about animal consciousness that had already been caught betweenphilosophers, psychologists and other scientists. For if it is found thatanimals can think, so the idea that consciousness is an attributeunique to humans - a basic assumption in Western thought since Descartes- Becomes untenable.
Gus, Alex and Kanzi are not Cartesian automatons, but whattheir degree of consciousness? They experience pain, desire and othersensations the way humans do? (Philosophers call thisphenomenal consciousness). They are able to reflect onyour experiences? (Philosophers call this self-consciousness).They have beliefs? What about remembering the past? Do earthwormshave some form of consciousness? And the salamanders? Is itpossible to study the inner life of an animal?
For some unsuspecting scene might seem just another of the manyepisodes of feeding animals at the zoo, but the exercise withstone and lunch in Central Park bears the name and most honorable of"Animal enrichment" and is intended to stimulate the bears'as well as their appetites. This is a concept for which theBears should thank, in large part to Griffin, who is 85years of age.
Twenty-five years, he published a short book suggesting that thehumans did not have the monopoly on thoughts and feelings.Animals, he argued, most likely had them, too.Scientists were appalled. According to behaviorist theorydominant at the time, animals were little more than "automatacapable of responding to stimuli, "robots that possess a nervous systemcentral.
The idea that an ant or an elephant might have thoughts,images, experiences or beliefs was not just laughable: it wasseditious. After Dr. Griffin published a second brief onof animal consciousness in the 1980s, a behaviorist labeledwork as "'The Satanic Verses' of animal behavior."
Were it not for the fact that he occupied a respectable position inRockefeller University and an international reputation, perhaps Griffinwould lose their jobs. (As a graduate student inHarvard, in 1940, he helped solve a mystery:how bats navigate in the dark, and coined the term echolocationto describe the phenomenon).
"He insisted that people look at animal consciousnesstime when it was considered anthropomorphic and ethereal, "said SarahBlaffer Hardy, an emeritus professor of anthropology at the University ofCalifornia at Davis. "Anyone else would have been hooted."
But the field Dr. Griffin christened cognitive ethology finaljust revenge. Over the past decade came an avalanche of newdata that appear to have caused the tide turned in his favor. InArizona an African Grey parrot named Alex can identify colors andshapes as well as any other child in a preschool. In Georgia abonobo ape named Kanzi converses with his trainer for a keyboardcomputer and watches Tarzan movies on television.
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)presented a study suggesting that rats dream. ProgramsAnimal enrichment featuring mental puzzles under the guisetoys or games have become a part of daily life forzoos. And this spring, the editor of the University of Chicagopublish an updated edition of the book released in 1992 by Griffin,"Animal Minds."But Griffin, a tall, slim and elegant and has a predilectionSpecial themes for ties with the animal world, is too modest tosay that these developments as its achievement. "We know sois very little, "he says." Scientists, and I count myself among them,became very cautious. The first works aboutgestures and facial expressions of the primates have been terriblymisinterpreted. "
Indeed, recent findings seem to have only intensified thedebate about animal consciousness that had already been caught betweenphilosophers, psychologists and other scientists. For if it is found thatanimals can think, so the idea that consciousness is an attributeunique to humans - a basic assumption in Western thought since Descartes- Becomes untenable.
Gus, Alex and Kanzi are not Cartesian automatons, but whattheir degree of consciousness? They experience pain, desire and othersensations the way humans do? (Philosophers call thisphenomenal consciousness). They are able to reflect onyour experiences? (Philosophers call this self-consciousness).They have beliefs? What about remembering the past? Do earthwormshave some form of consciousness? And the salamanders? Is itpossible to study the inner life of an animal?
Fonte: THE NEW YORK TIMES - 05/02/2001
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